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1 Summary
We discuss a problem concerning Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin’s (1979) definition of
a rich domain and a very well-known result they established for these domains: on rich
domains, if a social choice function is implementable in Nash strategies, then it is truthfully
implementable in dominant strategies (Dasgupta et al., 1979, Theorem 7.2.3). This result is
cited many times in later papers, e.g., Laffont and Maskin (1982, Theorem 4) and Maskin
(1985, Theorem 7). Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin’s (1979) proof of this result essentially
is based on showing that (Maskin) monotonicity implies strategy-proofness (or equivalently
independent person-by-person monotonicity IPM).
In the sequel we abbreviate Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin (1979) by DHM. We de-
scribe DHM’s model in Section 2.
In Section 3 we first construct an example of a DHM rich domain and a social choice
function that is monotonic but not strategy-proof (Example 1).1 This suggests that DHM’s
rich domain definition is not sufficient to show that monotonicity implies strategy-proofness
(or that Nash implementability implies truthful implementability in dominant strategies). We
then investigate which step in DHM’s proof is problematic – since DHM do not give a direct
proof of the result, we reproduce Maskin’s (1985) proof.2
In Section 4, we consider the presentation of DHM’s definition of a rich domain in Maskin
and Sjo¨stro¨m (2002). It turns out that their definition of a rich domain is different from
DHM’s original definition. With this adjusted richness condition the proof that monotonicity
implies strategy-proofness is correct.
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1The social choice function described in Example 1 is implementable in Nash strategies, but it is not
truthfully implementable in dominant strategies.
2We discuss the problem in the original proof in Footnote 6.
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2 The Model
We describe the essential elements of the model as introduced in DHM and Maskin (1985) –
for more details we refer to these articles.
Let A be a set of (feasible) social alternatives and I = {1, . . . , n} be a finite set of agents (in
Maskin and Sjo¨stro¨m, 2002, N denotes the set of agents). Each agent i ∈ I has a preference
ordering or preference relation Ri on the set A. Alternatively (as in Maskin, 1985), we can
represent agent i’s preference relation by a utility function ui : A→ R. By RA we denote the
class of all preference relations on A and R denotes the set of preference profiles R = (Ri)i∈I
such that for all i ∈ I, Ri ⊆ RA. A social choice function f : R → A is a function that
assigns to every preference profile R ∈ R a social alternative f(R) ∈ A.3
First, we discuss the incentive property strategy-proofness, which requires that no agent
ever benefits from misrepresenting his preference relation. For agent i ∈ I, preference profile
R ∈ R, and preference relation R′i ∈ RA, we obtain preference profile (R′i, R−i) ∈ R by
replacing Ri at R by R′i.
Strategy-Proofness: A social choice function f is strategy-proof if ∀R ∈ R, ∀i ∈ I, and
∀R¯i ∈ RA, f(R)Ri f(R¯i, R−i).
In game theoretical terms, a solution is strategy-proof if in its associated direct revelation
game form, it is a weakly dominant strategy for each agent to announce his true preference
relation.
Next, we define monotonicity. Loosely speaking, a social choice function is monotonic if
an alternative a that is chosen at preference profile R is also chosen at a preference profile R′
at which a is considered (weakly) better by all agents.
Monotonicity (DHM): “A social choice function f is monotonic if ∀{R,R′} ⊆ R, ∀a ∈ A, if
f(R) = a and if ∀i ∈ I, ∀b ∈ A, a Ri b⇒ a R′i b, then f(R′) = a.”
If {R,R′} ⊆ R and a ∈ A such that ∀i ∈ I, ∀b ∈ A, a Ri b ⇒ a R′i b, then we call R′ a
monotonic transformation of R at a.
3 A Problem with DHM’s original Richness Condition
We now quote DHM’s definition of a rich domain.
Rich Domain (DHM): “For a set of alternatives, A, the domain R ⊆ RA is said to be rich iff
∀{R,R′} ⊆ R and ∀{a, b} ⊆ A such that aR b⇒ aR′ b and a P b⇒ a P ′ b, then, there exists
R′′ ∈ R such that ∀c ∈ A, a R c⇒ a R′′ c and b R′ c⇒ b R′′ c. If Ri is rich for all i ∈ I, then
R = ΠRi will also be called rich.”
Maskin (1985) calls a rich domain monotonically closed. For completeness, we also quote
Maskin’s definition of a monotonically closed domain.
3DHM and Maskin (1985) consider social choice rules/correspondences f : R⇒ A, but the results we refer
to only concern single-valued social choice rules/correspondences. In all definition and results we quote, we
will adjust notation in order to accommodate for single-valuedness.
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Monotonically Closed Domain (Maskin, 1985): “A class U of utility functions is a monoton-
ically closed domain if, for all pairs {u, u′} ⊆ U and {a, b} ⊆ A such that (i) u(a) ≥ u(b)
implies u′(a) ≥ u′(b) and (ii) u(a) > u(b) implies u′(a) > u′(b), there exists u′′ ∈ U such that
for all c ∈ A (iii) u(a) ≥ c implies u′′(a) ≥ u′′(c), and (iv) u′(b) ≥ u′(c) implies u′′(b) ≥ u′′(c).”
We are interested in the relationship between monotonicity and strategy-proofness. A
well-known result that is implied by DHM’s results and that is quoted in the literature is
that on rich domains, monotonicity implies strategy-proofness. DHM’s Theorem 7.2.3 and
Maskin’s Theorem 7 are phrased slightly differently, but both results immediately induce the
above relationship of monotonicity and strategy-proofness on rich domains.4
The following example demonstrates that DHM’s richness condition is not sufficient to
show that monotonicity implies strategy-proofness.
Example 1. Let I = {1}, A = {a, b, c, d}, and R = {R,R′} where R and R′ are strict
orderings on A such that a P b P c P d and d P ′ c P ′ b P ′ a. The social choice function f is
defined by f(R) = c and f(R′) = b.
Since there is a preference reversal between any two alternatives when moving from R to
R′ or vice versa, there is no pair of alternatives {a, b} ⊆ A, a 6= b, such that [a R b ⇒ a R′ b
and aP b⇒ aP ′ b] or [aR′ b⇒ aRb and aP ′ b⇒ aP b]. Thus, the domain R is rich according
to DHM. Furthermore, none of the preference relations is a monotonic transformation of the
other preference relation. Hence, f satisfies monotonicity. However, f is not strategy-proof.
For instance, if agent 1 has preference relation R, then reporting R′ instead would be beneficial
because b = f(R′) P f(R) = c. 
Example 1 already indicates a crucial situation that does not seem to be addressed in
DHM’s proof, namely the situation that there exist R,R′ ∈ R and i ∈ I such that R′ =
(R′i, R−i), f(R) = a, f(R
′) = b, b Pi a, and a P ′i b.
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We now go through Maskin’s (1985) proof. Maskin (1985) uses the following condition
that is equivalent to strategy-proofness when modified for social choice functions.
Independent Person-by-Person Monotonicity (IPM):6 “A social choice function f satisfies
IPM if for all (u1, . . . , un) ∈ U1 × U2 × . . . × Un, all i, all u¯i ∈ Ui and all a, b ∈ A such that
f(u1, . . . , un) = a and u¯i(a) > u¯i(b), it must be the case that f(u¯i, u−i) 6= b.”
Lemma 1. A social choice function f satisfies IPM if and only if it is strategy-proof.
Proof. Assume that f does not satisfy IPM. Then, there exist (u1, . . . , un) ∈ U1×U2×. . .×Un,
i ∈ I, and u¯i ∈ Ui such that f(u1, . . . , un) = a, f(u¯i, u−i) = b, and u¯i(a) > u¯i(b). Hence, f
does not satisfy strategy-proofness (agent i with utility function u¯i benefits by reporting ui).
4DHM’s Theorem 7.2.3: If R is a rich domain, then if the social choice function f : R→ A is implementable
in Nash strategies, it is truthfully implementable in dominant strategies.
5It is clear from Example 1 that the problem extends to environments with more than one agent.
6Note that Maskin’s (1985) definition of IPM quoted here is different from DHM’s definition of IPM.
DHM’s Independent Person-by-Person Monotonicity (IPM): “The social choice function f : R → A satisfies
IPM iff ∀R ∈ R, ∀i ∈ I, ∀R′i ∈ Ri, ∀{a, b} ⊆ A, if f(R) = a and a Ri b⇒ a P ′i b, then f(R′i, R−i) 6= b.”
With DHM’s definition of IPM the equivalence between IPM and strategy-proofness is wrong. Thus, DHM’s
Theorem 4.3.1 is not correct. The problem with the proof of DHM’s Theorem 4.3.1 is similar to the problem
that we will discuss for the proof of Maskin’s (1985) Theorem 7. (DHM, page 198, line 2, write that “Since
b Pi a, we conclude by IPM, . . ..” The problem is that IPM according to DHM can only be applied in this
situation if also b R′i a, which is not necessarily the case.)
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Assume that f does not satisfy strategy-proofness. Then, there exist (u1, . . . , un) ∈ U1 ×
U2 × . . . × Un, i ∈ I, and u¯i ∈ Ui such that f(u1, . . . , un) = a, f(u¯i, u−i) = b, and ui(b) >
ui(a). Hence, f does not satisfy IPM (by IPM, f(u¯i, u−i) = b and ui(b) > ui(a) imply
f(u1, . . . , un) 6= a).
We now quote (Maskin, 1985, Theorem 7) and its proof.
Theorem 7 (Maskin, 1985): “If Ui is monotonically closed for all i, then if the social choice
function f is implementable in Nash equilibrium, it is truthfully implementable in dominant
strategies.”
Proof. “If f is implementable in Nash equilibrium, then it is monotonic. If f violates IPM,
there would exist (u1, . . . , un), u¯i, a, and b such that f(u1, . . . , un) = a and u¯i(a) > u¯i(b) but
f(u¯i, u−i) = b. From the monotonic closure of Ui, however, there exists u¯i ∈ Ui such
that for all c
ui(a) ≥ ui(c) implies u¯i(a) ≥ u¯i(c)
and
u¯i(b) ≥ u¯i(c) implies u¯i(b) ≥ u¯i(c).
From monotonicity applied to (ui, u−i) and (u¯i, u−i), we have f(u¯i, u−i) = a. But from
monotonicity applied to (u¯i, u−i) and (u¯i, u−i), f(u¯i, u¯−i) = b, a contradiction of f ’s single-
valuedness. Therefore, f satisfies IPM, and so is truthfully implementable in dominant strate-
gies.”
It is obvious that the above theorem and proof should also establish the result that on
rich domains, monotonicity implies strategy-proofness. So what goes wrong?
Let’s look at lines 2 and 3 of the proof, particularly the parts that are marked in boldface.
From the assumption that IPM is violated one does not obtain pairs {ui, u′i} ⊆ Ui and
{a, b} ⊆ A such that (i) and (ii) in the definition of a monotonically closed domain are
satisfied. To apply the monotonic closure condition, i.e., to satisfy (i) and (ii), one would need
in addition to u¯i(a) > u¯i(b) that ui(a) ≥ ui(b). However, if u¯i(a) > u¯i(b) and ui(a) < ui(b) (a
case that we cannot exclude as demonstrated in Example 1), then the fact that the domain
is monotonically closed is not enough to complete the proof.
4 Maskin and Sjo¨stro¨m’s (2002) Richness Condition
Let us now consider Maskin and Sjo¨stro¨m’s (2002) definition of a rich domain. For the
additional notation we use we refer to Maskin and Sjo¨stro¨m (2002).7 Although the authors
state that they replicate some of DHM’s results, we show below that this is not the case.
Before doing so, we first introduce the notion of improvement used in Maskin and Sjo¨stro¨m’s
(2002) definition of a rich domain. With this definition, the problems we encountered in DHM
are fixed.
Improvement : “If ui(a, θ) ≥ ui(b, θ) and ui(a, θ′) ≤ ui(b, θ′) and at least one inequality is
strict, then b improves with respect to a for agent i as the state changes from θ to θ′.”
7Essentially, by equating characteristics with preferences we can translate Maskin and Sjo¨stro¨m’s notation
to the notation used so far. For example, ui(a, θ) would correspond to ui(a) and ui(a, θ
′) would correspond to
u′i(a).
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Agent i’s lower contour set at (a, θ) ∈ A×Θ is Li(a, θ) := {b ∈ A : ui(a, θ) ≥ ui(b, θ)}.
Rich domain (Maskin and Sjo¨stro¨m, 2002): “For any a, b ∈ A and any θ, θ′ ∈ Θ, if, for all
i ∈ N , b does not improve with respect to a for when the state changes from θ to θ′, then
there exists θ′′ ∈ Θ such that Li(a, θ) ⊆ Li(a, θ′′) and Li(b, θ′) ⊆ Li(b, θ′′) for all i ∈ N .”
Given a social choice function f , we define f¯ : R(Θ) → A such that f¯(R(θ)) = f(θ) for
all θ ∈ Θ. If f is monotonic, then f¯ is well defined.
Coalitional Strategy-Proofness (Maskin and Sjo¨stro¨m, 2002): “A social choice function f is
coalitionally strategy-proof if for all θ ∈ Θ, for all nonempty coalitions C ⊆ N , and all
preferences R′C ∈ R(Θ), there exists i ∈ C such that ui(f¯(RC , R−C), θ) ≥ ui(f¯(R′C , R−C), θ),
where (RC , R−C) = (RC(θ), R−C(θ)).”
Note that coalitional strategy-proofness implies ordinary strategy-proofness.
Theorem 7 (Maskin and Sjo¨stro¨m, 2002): “Suppose f is a monotonic social choice
function, the domain is rich, and the preference domain has a product structure R(Θ) =
×ni=1Ri. Then f is coalitionally strategy-proof.”
Proof. “Let f be as hypothesized. Let C ⊆ N be any coalition. Suppose that the true
preference profile in state θ is R = (RC , R−C) = R(θ). Consider a preference profile R′ =
R(θ′) = (R′C , R−C) with R
′
i 6= Ri for i ∈ C and R′i = Ri for i 6∈ C. Let a = f(θ) = f¯(RC , R−C)
and b = f(θ′) = f¯(R′C , R−C). If a = b then ui(f¯(RC , R−C), θ) ≥ ui(f¯(R′C , R−C), θ) holds
trivially for all i ∈ C, so suppose a 6= b.
We claim that there exists i ∈ C such that b improves with respect to a for agent i as the
state changes from θ to θ′. Notice that because R′i = Ri for i /∈ C, b cannot improve with
respect to a for any such agent. Hence, if the claim is false, the definition of rich domain
implies that there exists θ′′ ∈ Θ such that Li(a, θ) ⊆ Li(a, θ′) and Li(b, θ′) ⊆ Li(b, θ′′) for all
i ∈ N . But then, from monotonicity, we have a = f(θ′′) and b = f(θ′′), a contradiction of f ’s
single-valuedness. Hence the claim holds after all.
But b improving with respect to a for agent i ∈ C implies that
ui(f¯(RC , R−C), θ) ≥ ui(f¯(R′C , R−C), θ),
and so f is coalitionally strategy-proof as claimed.”
To see that the proof indeed works, for some i ∈ I consider the case ui(a, θ) < ui(b, θ) and
ui(a, θ′) > ui(b, θ′) (cf. Example 1). Thus, by the definition of an improvement, b does not
improve with respect to a for agent i as the state changes from θ to θ′. Hence, by Maskin and
Sjo¨stro¨m’s (2002) definition of a rich domain, there exists θ′′ such that Li(a, θ) ⊆ Li(a, θ′′)
and Li(b, θ′) ⊆ Li(b, θ′′). Hence, the domain identified in Example 1 is not rich according to
Maskin and Sjo¨stro¨m (2002), but it is rich according to DHM’s original richness definition.
Remark 1. The main role the richness condition has is to guarantee that for certain pref-
erence profiles R,R′ ∈ R and certain alternatives a, b ∈ A a third preference profile R′′ ∈ R
exists such that (1) R′′ is a monotonic transformation of R at a and (2) R′′ is a monotonic
transformation of R′ at b, or alternatively, (3) R′′ is a monotonic transformation of R′ at a
and (2) R′′ is a monotonic transformation of R at b.
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The table below demonstrates that the two richness definitions in DHM and Maskin
and Sjo¨stro¨m (2002) induce the existence of different monotonic transformations. The entry
“DHM” indicates that according to DHM a certain monotonic transformation R′′ exists and
the entry “MS” indicates that according to Maskin and Sjo¨stro¨m (2002) a certain monotonic
transformation R′′ exists.
∃R′′ s.t. (1) & (2) ∃R′′ s.t. (3) & (4)
a Pi b & a P ′i b DHM MS MS
a Pi b & a I ′i b DHM MS
a Pi b & b P ′i a MS
a Ii b & a P ′i b DHM MS
a Ii b & a I ′i b DHM MS DHM MS
a Ii b & b P ′i a DHM MS
b Pi a & a P ′i b MS
b Pi a & a I ′i b MS DHM
b Pi a & b P ′i a DHM MS DHM MS
We see from the table above that according to the richness definition used, different monotonic
transformations are required to exist. Maskin and Sjo¨stro¨m’s (2002) richness also “covers”
the critical case a Pi b and b P ′i a indicated in Example 1. 4
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